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SNYDER v. AMERICANASSOCIATION OF BLOOD
BANKS: BALANCING DUTIES AND IMMUNITIES IN
ASSESSING THE THI
PARTY LIABILITY OF
NON-PROFIT MEDICAL ASSOCIATIONS
JamesA. Filkins*

INTRODUCTION
A defendant's liability for a tortious act may often depend upon the
interplay of complex and frequently competing policy considerations.
Social policies and ideas of fairness are combined in decisions to
impose liability. A useful illustration of the difficulty of this problem
can be found in the tension between duties, which extend defendants'
liabilities, and immunities, which limit them. Snyder i' American
Association of Blood Banks' is a case in point. The case underscores
the difficulty and complexity of balancing policies mandating broader
impositions of duties against competing policies warranting further
extensions of immunities. As Snyder demonstrates, the difficulty in
imposing liability lies not only in deciding when reasons of policy may
permit an immunity to offset a duty, but in defining what duties are and
to whom immunities should apply.

*Deputy Medical Examiner, Office of the Medical Examiner, County of Cook, Chicago.

IL; B.A., MeNeese State University, 1976; M.A., University of Illinois, 1977. PhD,
University of Illinois, 1983; M.D., Southern Illinois University School of Medicine. 1990; JD
(Cand.), DePaul University College of Law, 2000.
'See Snyder v. American Assoc. of Blood Banks, 676 A,2d 1036 (N.J. 1996),
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Duties
Although it is a well-settled principle of tort law that an action for
negligence must be based upon a breach of some duty owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff, 2 the legal test by which a duty can be
identified and defined has remained elusive. 3 Duty is "a shorthand
statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself."4 It is
a means of balancing considerations of policy, limiting a defendant's
responsibility for a tortious act, against5 considerations of policy
entitling a plaintiff to redress for an injury.
Policy considerations may also extend a defendant's duty to a
third party. Section 324a of the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (second)
states "one who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the
protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the
third person for physical harm..."6 Privity, that is, a mutual interest
between parties arising from a contract, need not exist to trigger the
defendant's duty to the third party.7 If the second party justifiably
relies on the defendant's undertaking to the harm of the third party,
then the defendant is liable to the third party.8 Changing social
conditions reshape policy considerations so that new duties continually
evolve. 9 "No better general statement can be made than that the courts
will find a duty where, in general, reasonable persons would recognize
it and agree that it exists."'10 The calculus of liability does not,
however, end in the finding of a duty.

2

See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, 357-58, (5th
ed. 1984). Three English cases introduced the concept of duty into Anglo-American tort law a
century and a half ago: Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837); Landridge v. Levy,
150 Eng. Rep. 863 (1836); and Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). See id at
357.
3
See
4

Keeton, supra note 2, at 357-58.
See id. at 358.

5

See id.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324a (1965).
7
See id.
6

8

See id.

9

See Keeton, supra note 2, at 358-59.

'0See id. at 359.
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Immunities
Although courts may find duties where "reasonable persons" would
agree new duties exist, the courts may also find that other competing,
policy considerations nullify a defendant's liability."
The same
changing social conditions, which bring about new duties, also reshape
policy considerations determining how far immunity, that is, freedom
from liability for a tortious act, will extend. 12 Traditionally, judges and
legislators receive absolute immunity for acts done within the scope of
their judicial or legislative duties. 13 Even if the official acts
14
maliciously or in bad faith, absolute immunity protects him.
Immunity has also been extended to "adjuncts" of the judicial system
such as prosecutors and grand jurors, as well as to other state and
federal officers.' 5 Whether an official receives absolute immunity or
qualified immunity-that is, immunity based on good faith and an
absence of malice, depends upon the "functional comparability" of the
official's duties to those of a judge.' 6 If the duties are essentially
judicial, absolute immunity applies; if the duties are administrative and
discretionary, qualified immunity is granted. 17 Over the years, the
grant of immunity to private individuals and organizations performing
quasi-governmental functions has been extended, as governmental
responsibilities have grown more complex and governmental reliance
on private individuals and organizations to assist in the discharge of
those responsibilities has expanded.18 Immunities have, for example,
been extended
to charities,' 9 private contractors,20 and private
21
arbitrators.
"Id at 358, 1032-33.
'2See id at 1032.

13See id at 1056-58. The common law grant of immunity to judges was upheld in
Bradley v. Fisher, SO U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872); that of legislators in Kiilboum v. Thompz-on,
103 U.S. 68 (1881), and more recently in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). Sce td.
at 1056 n.4, 1058 n.25.
14 See Keeton, supra note 3, at 1057.
'5See id at 1057-59.
16M at 1057. The term "functional comparability" was first used in Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20 (1976). The term was affirmed and expanded upon a year later in Butz
v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513-15 (1977). See infra pp. 30-32.
"See id at 1058, 1060.
'See Snyder v. American Ass'n of Blood Banks, 676 A.2d 1036, 1060 (NJ. 1996),
9
Keeton, supra note 2, at 1069. American courts followed a mid-nineteenth century
English case, Feoffees of Heriot's Hosp. v. Ross, 8 Eng. Rep. 1503 (1846), in extending
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Absolute immunity for charities was based on a perceived need to
protect non-profit organizations performing good works. 22 Courts
justified charitable immunities on several grounds: the imposition of
liability on non-profit organizations would divert trust funds away from
a donor's intent, respondeatsuperior did not justify imposing liability
on charities, and the imposition of liability would discourage
donations. 23 Absolute immunity for charities was short-lived, but 2some
4
measure of immunity for charities still exists in some jurisdictions.
Immunity granted to private contractors and mediators based on
their "functional comparability" to government actors is intended to
protect private actors, who perform tasks the government would
otherwise have to undertake, and to encourage private actors to
continue participating in public activities.2 5 In De Vargas v. Mason &
Hanger-Silas Mason Company,26 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit applied a three-part test to determine when a
private party was entitled to qualified immunity. 7 First, the private
party had to perform a duty imposed by a contract with a governmental
entity. 28 Second, the private party had to perform a governmental
function.2 9 Finally, the private party had to be sued
solely on the basis
30
contract.
governmental
the
to
pursuant
done
acts
of

immunity to charities. As Prof. Keeton notes, charitable immunity is in retreat in many
jurisdictions.
See id. at 1070.
20

See Snyder, 676 A.2d at 1060 (citing Citrano v. Allen Correctional Ctr., 891 F. Supp.

312, 317 (W.D. La. 1995) and City of Durham v. Reidsville Eng'g Co., 120 S.E.2d 564, 567
(N.C. 1961)).
21See id. See generally Cassandra E. Joseph, The Scope of Mediator Immunity: When
Mediators Can Invoke Absolute Immunity, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 625, 634-53 (1997)

(discussing the extension of immunity to private arbitrators as arbitration has grown as a means
of alternative
dispute resolution).
22
See Keeton, supra note 2, at 1070.
23See id.
24
See id.
25
See Joseph, supra note 21, at 646-48.
26
See DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 844 F.2d 814, 821-22 (10th Cir.
1988), cited in Joseph, supra note 21, at 646.
27
28See Joseph, supra note 21, at 646.
See id.at 722.
29
See id.
3
See id.
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Non-Profit Medical Associations
Non-profit medical associations like the American Association of
Blood Banks (AABB) present a special problem in deciding when
immunities should apply to them.
Such associations possess
characteristics of both charitable organizations as well as private parties
acting under governmental contracts. Non-profit medical associations
provide support and assurances of quality to those relying on the
profession's services. 31 Ostensibly, this is done out of a sense of
responsibility, rather than financial gain. In this regard, non-profit
medical associations resemble charities to a degree. To the extent nonprofit medical associations also undertake work the government would
have to do, such as formulating professional regulations and standards,
non-profit medical associations resemble private contractors." Often
their work in devising standards is undertaken without an explicit grant
of governmental authority. 33 In this regard non-profit professional
34
medical associations may resemble for-profit trade associations.
However, despite their non-profit status, the work of such medical
associations may produce substantial revenue vesting the officers and
employees of the association with an economic interest in the
association's growth.35 Under what circumstances, then, should policy
considerations impose duties on non-profit medical associations to third
parties, and when, if ever, should policy considerations permit nonprofit medical associations to claim immunity?
In Snyder the majority found considerations of policy imposed a
duty on the defendant AABB, a non-profit professional association of
31

See, e.g., Ross D. Eckert, The AIDS Blood Transfusion Cases' A Lecal and Economto
Analysis of Liability, 29 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 202, 246 (1992) (discussing the AABB in
particular).
32
See Snyder v. American Ass'n of Blood Banks, 676 A.2d 1036, 1069 (NJ.1996);
Eckert, supra note 31, at 223 (discussing the relationship of the Food & Drug Administration
(FDA) to the AABB).
33
34See Snyder, 676 A.2d at 1060.
See, e.g., Meyers v. Donatacci, 531 A.2d 398, 403 (N.J.1904) (discusing the National
Spa and Pool Institute); Prudential Property v. American Plywood Ass'n, No. 932026 1994 WL

463527, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (discussing the American Plyw;ood Association); FNS
Mortgage Serv. v. Pacific Gen. Group, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 917 (Ct. App. Cal. 1994)
(discussing the International Association of Plumbing Manufacturers). See also Freddie Ann
Hoffman, & Peter H. Rheinstein, Health Professionsand the Regulated Industry th Laws and
Regulations Enforced by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, LEGAL MEDIMtNE 585, 690-

01 (4th ed. 1998).
3

'See Snyder, 676 A.2d at 1047.

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 3:243

blood banks, to a third-party blood product recipient. 36 The lone
dissenter argued on the basis of competing policy considerations that
qualified immunity, that is, immunity based on good faith, should
protect the AABB.3 The goal of this note is to examine the policy
considerations in Snyder that led to the imposition of a duty on the
defendant, as well as to those competing policy considerations that led
the dissent to argue qualified immunity should be granted. First, this
note will review the facts and procedural history of Snyder. Then the
note will examine the majority opinion. The third part of this note will
consider the dissenting opinion. Particular attention will be given to
the dissent's use of cases in which immunity has been extended to
private parties and to the dissent's definition of "functional
comparability." The note will also consider the impact the Snyder
decision may have as medical technology advances. Finally, this note
will suggest that the need to protect from liability certain categories of
decisions made by non-profit medical associations may justify a grant
of qualified immunity in the absence of any formal delegation of
governmental authority to the association.
BACKGROUND
The Facts of the Case
On August 23, 1984 William Snyder, the plaintiff, underwent elective
coronary artery by-pass graft surgery and an aortic valve replacement at
St. Joseph's Hospital in Paterson, New Jersey. 3 8 Dr. Harotune
Mekhjian and his assistants, Drs. Yougick Lee and Wilmo Orejola
performed the surgery. 39 Several hours after the first operation, Dr.
Mekhjian performed a second operation on Mr. Snyder to repair a
bleeding artery. 40 During the second operation, the plaintiff received
several units of blood products, including a unit of platelets bearing the
serial number 29F0784. 4 ' The unit of platelets had been collected by
the Bergen County Blood Center (BCBC) at a bloodmobile in
36

See id. at 1055.
37See id. at 1064.
3"See Snyder v. Mekhjian, 582 A.2d 307, 309 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
39See id.
40
See id.
41
See id.
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Hacksensack, New Jersey 42 and supplied to the blood bank at St.
Joseph's. BCBC is a non-profit collector and supplier of donated blood
to hospitals.43 The plaintiffs recovery continued without
45 further
problems. 44 Several weeks later the hospital discharged him.
In March 1985 the Enzyme Linked Immunoabsorbent Screening
Assay (ELISA) test for the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)
antibody became available.46 The ELISA test enabled blood banks to
screen all donated blood for HIV antibodies, that is, for antibodies to
the virus that causes acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS).47
The test also allowed identification of HIV positive donors, prompting
blood banks to check whether any of those donors had given blood
before March 1985, and if so, to which hospital their blood had been
supplied.4 S In October 1986, BCBC informed St. Joseph's that unit
29F0784 came from a donor who had tested positive for HIV.4 After a
review of its records, St. Joseph's informed Mr. Snyder's physician of
the HIV-infected platelets, however, the physician
had already learned
50
that Mr. Snyder had tested positive for the virus.
Procedural History
The plaintiff filed suit in February 1989 naming the physicians
involved in his care, St. Joseph's Hospital, BCBC, and the AABB as
defendants. 5 ' BCBC is a member of the AABB. -2 The plaintiff
asserted claims of strict liability and negligence against all
defendants.53 Specifically, the plaintiff claimed the AABB negligently

42

See id
See Snyder v. Mekhjian 593 A.2d 318, 319 (N.J. 1991) (per curiam).

43

44See
id
4
4

SSee id
"See P.L. MOLLISON, E" AL., BLOOD TRANSFUSION INCLINICAL MEDICINE 7U0 Guth ed.

1987). 47

See id.; AMrIaCAN ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS TEcHICAL McANUAL 427 (10th ed.

1990). 4

SSee Snyder, 582 A.2d at 309.

49

See id

0

" See id.
"1See id
S2See id.
53
See Snyder, 582 A.2d at 309.
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54
failed to promulgate surrogate testing procedures for screening blood,
thereby greatly increasing his risk of receiving contaminated blood 55
The trial court, on motions for summary judgment, dismissed the

strict liability claims against all defendants, dismissed all claims against
St. Joseph's Hospital, and dismissed the punitive damage claims
against the physicians.56 The trial court also ruled BCBC was not
entitled to charitable immunity. 57 Finally, to protect the confidentiality
of AIDS blood bank records, the trial court denied the plaintiffs

request for the production by BCBC of its records identifying the donor
of unit 29F0784.55
Snyder appealed only on the issues of the strict liability claims and
the denial of donor discovery. 59 The Appellate Division of the Superior
Court of New Jersey affirmed the dismissal of the strict liability claims,
reversed the denial of donor discovery, and remanded for trial the
negligence claims. 60 The defendants moved for permission to appeal
the reversal of the denial of donor discovery to the Supreme Court of
New Jersey. 61 The court granted the appeal, but upon review affirmed

54

Until the ELISA test was first used in 1985, there was no blood test that specifically
identified HIV. By 1982, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) believed a virus transmitted
by blood or blood products and sexual contact caused AIDS. See RANDY SHiLTS, AND TlE
BAND PLAYED ON: POLTMCS, PEOPLE, AND TIIE AIDS EPIDEMIC, 220 (1987). In the years
before the introduction of the ELISA test, the CDC-sponsored AIDS Task Force recommended
surrogate testing as one method of excluding potential blood donors at high risk for
transmitting HIV. See id. at 220, 225. Studies had shown homosexual males, intravenous drug
users, and Haitian immigrants had a much higher incidence of AIDS than the general
population. See id. at 220-22. Those three groups also had higher incidences of hepatitis and
certain white blood cell abnormalities. The Task Force proposed that surrogate tests, that is
tests for hepatitis or white blood cell abnormalities, be used to screen blood donors. Surrogate
testing was intended to identify indirectly those individuals likely to have AIDS by identi(ing
hepatitis or white blood cell abnormalities, two disorders known to be found in a high
percentage of AIDS patients. See id. at 221-22.
55See Snyder, 582 A.2d at 310. At the time the lawsuit was filed New Jersey was one of
a handful of states with no blood shield laws. Blood shield laws exempt blood banks from
strict liability for transfusion related diseases and are yet another example of the complexity of
balancing duties and immunities. See Eckert, supra note 31, at 205 and n.8.
"See Snyder, 582 A.2d at 310.
5
See id.
5
See id.
"See
id.
60
See id at 315.
61
See Snyder, 582 A.2d at 319.
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reversal, holding that limited discovery of the
the Appellate Division's
62
donor was proper.
Following remand, the trial court found the AABB had acted
negligently in failing to promulgate surrogate testing to its member
blood banks.6 3 The trial court held the AABB owed the plaintiff a duty
of care and that the AABB's failure to recommend surrogate testing
greatly increased thePlaintiffs risk of becoming infected with HIVThe defendant appealed, but the Appellate
contaminated blood.
Division upheld the trial court's rulings.6 5 The defendant petitioned to
the Supreme Court of New Jersey for permission to appeal, which the
Court, upon review, upheld the rulings
court granted. 66 The Supreme
67
Division.
of the Appellate
THLE SNYDER DECISION
New Jersey Precedents
The issue on appeal in Snyder focused upon whether the AABB owed a
duty of care to the plaintiff, a blood product recipient." In formulating
its analysis of the duty of care in Snyder, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey relied substantially upon two recent New Jersey cases. 9 The
two cases emphasized not only the wide latitude a New Jersey court
could exercise in finding and imposing a duty, but also the essentially
subjective quality of duty analysis. In Dunphy it Gregor,70 a case in
which the fiancde of an automobile accident victim sued for negligent
infliction of emotional distress, the court set out an analysis of a
defendant's duty the Snyder court would follow very closely. 7 1 The
court in Dunphy held the imposition of duty must be the result of a
complex analysis including not only foreseeability, but also other
62

See id at 345.

63

See Snyder v. American Ass'n of Blood Banks, 659 A.2d 4S2, 4S4 IN J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1995).
66See
6

67

6

id

S5ee id
5See Snyder v. American Ass'n of Blood Banks, 676 A.2d 1036 (N.J. 1996).
See id.at 1055.

SSee id at 1038.
69
See Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 376 (N.J. 1994); Carter Lincoln-Mercury v.
EMAR70Group, 638 A.2d 1288, 1294 (N.J. 1994).
See Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 372.
71
See it at 376.
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factors such as the severity of the risk, the relationship of the parties,
72
and the effect on public policy the imposition of a duty would create.
Although the court conceded "a foreseeable risk is the indispensable
cornerstone of any formulation of a duty of care ...
ultimately, whether
73
The court emphasized the
a duty exists is a matter of fairness."
imposition of a duty must accord with public policy. 74 The court
applied its analysis to avoid finding a duty in Dunphy, but it conceded
duties 5could be adapted to impose liability in new or controversial
7
areas.
In CarterLincoln-Mercury v. Emar Group7 6 the plaintiff brought
an action against his insurance broker after discovering the insurer was
going out of business and his claim would remain unpaid." The court
in Carter emphasized that foreseeability alone was insufficient to
78
impose a duty, but agreed foreseeability was a crucial element.
Foreseeability, the court continued, was a concept under which other
relevant factors were subsumed. 79 Among those factors, as in Dunphy,
were the relationships of the parties, the nature of the risk, and finally,
The court's analysis
considerations of fairness and policy. 80
acknowledged the imposition of a duty was a subjective determination
requiring a value judgment.8 ' The Carter court held duty could be
relations,
extended to third parties, in spite of the absence of contractual
82
if considerations of foreseeability and fairness so required.
The Dunphy and CarterLincoln-Mercury decisions allowed New
Jersey courts to impose duty, and therefore liability, if the court
believed it was "fair" to do so without offering much guidance about
how a court should decide what was fair. s3 By emphasizing "fairness"

72
See id.
7'See id.
74
75See id. at 379.
See Dunphy, 642
6

A.2d at 376.
7 See Carter Lincoln-Mercury v. EMAR Group, 638 A.2d at 1288, 1288 (N.J. 1994).
77See id. at 1290.
78
See id. at 1294.
79See id.
"0See id.
81
See CarterLincoln-Mercury,638 A.2d at 1294.
82
See id.
3
See Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 380-81 (Garibaldi, J. dissenting); Carter Lincoln-Mercury,
638 A.2d at 299 (O'Hem, J. dissenting and concurring).
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and setting forth wide-ranging criteria in establishing duties,04 the
dissenting opinions in those two cases feared the decisions would grant
New Jersey courts substantial freedom in deciding when to impose
duties. The imposition of duty in New Jersey, as a result of the Dunphy
and Carter Lincoln-Mercury decisions, approached a discretionary
function of the individual court hearing a case.
The Majority Opinion
The AABB relied on a New Jersey trade association case, Aeyers v.
Donatacci, 5 to argue the AABB should owe no duty of care to third
party blood product recipients. s6 In Meyers, the plaintiff sued the
National Spa & Pool Institute (NSPI), a voluntary trade association
composed of swimming pool manufacturers.8 7 The question before the
Meyers court was whether a trade association such as the NSPI, which
only conducted research and reported the results to its members, owed
a duty to a consumer who was injured while using the product of one of
its members.ss Noting the NSPI lacked the authority to enforce its
standards, the court found NSPI standards nothing more than suggested
minimums, which could be implemented or rejected at the discretion of
individual members. s9 The NSPI neither mandated nor inspected any
member for compliance with its standards. 90 The court held there was
no duty because the NSPI could not foresee the plaintiff would be
injured by the NSPI's conduct. 91 The court added public policy would
not be served by imposing a duty because trade associations, such as
the NSPI, performed useful functions in promoting education, research.
84See Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 380-Si (Garibaldi, J. dissenting); CarterLincln.Akertzin
638 A.2d at 299 (O'Hem, J. dissenting and concurring).
85
See Meyers v. Donatacci, 531 A.2d 398, 400 (N.J. 1934).
E6See Snyder v. American Ass'n of Blood Banks, 676 A.2d 1036, 1049 (NIJ. 199 -6, The
AABB also argued the Noerr-Pennington doctrine as a defense, but the court held the ,*LBB's

liability did not rest on its right to petition the government. See ift
87
See Meyers, 531 A.2d at 399.
SSSee
id
9
S See id
9

'See id at 403.
91
See id In 1984 the plaintiff in Meyers suffered a spinal cord injury and quadriplegla
after diving headfirst into the shallow end of a swimming pool. The pool had been certified by
the NSPI, but no warning against diving appeared on the pool. The plaintiff alleged the NSPI
knew of the association between spinal cord injuries and diving as far back as 1974 and
therefore was negligent in failing to place warnings on swimming pools it certified. Sce t1 at
400-01.
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and standardization within their industries, as well as
in assisting the
92
government in areas the government did not regulate.
The court further held that Section 324A of the RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS (1965) 93 imposed no duty because the NSPI was not a "moneymaking operation" and did undertake the task of inducing the
manufacturers of swimming pools to rely on its standards, which the
plaintiff alleged it performed negligently.9 4 NSPI membership dues
were not fees creating a contract under which the NSPI would perform
research on behalf of the membership.95 Therefore, the NSPI did not
engage in a "specific undertaking," which if performed negligently
would trigger the application of section 324A.96
Thus, the example of a trade association offered by Meyers was
that of a loosely organized, voluntary association with negligible
authority over its members and little financial stake in the regulation of
industry standards. The AABB's argument that it owed no duty to
third party blood product recipients such as Mr. Snyder rested on what
the court perceived as a spurious comparison with the NSPI. 97
Although the Supreme Court of New Jersey did not cite Meyers in its
1996 decision, the court made clear it rejected any comparison between
the AABB and a weak trade association.9 8 The court acknowledged the
AABB had no direct connection with the donor of the contaminated
92
93See

Meyers, 531 A.2d at 404.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs, § 324A (1965). "One who undertakes
gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as
necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third
person ... " See id.
94
See Meyers, 531 A.2d at 405-06.
95
See id. at 406.
96
See id.
97
See Snyder, 659 A.2d at 492.
98See Snyder v. American Ass'n of Blood Banks, 676 A.2d 1036, 1050 (N.J. 1996). The
court's rejection of any comparison with a weak trade association was consistent with holdings
in other jurisdictions.
In other trade association cases in other jurisdictions, courts had
imposed duties on trade associations for injuries inflicted upon third parties when the trade
associations occupied dominate positions in their industries comparable to the AABB in blood
banking. See Prudential Property v. American Plywood Ass'n, No. 932026 1994 WL 463527,
at *1 (S.D. Fla. 1994), in which the American Plywood Association was held liable to third
parties because it was the industry leader in establishing plywood standards and FNS Mortgage
Serv. v. Pacific General Group, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916 (Ct. App. Cal. 1994), in which the
International Association of Plumbing Manufacturers was held liable because it enforced
conformity with its Uniform Plumbing Code by withdrawing certification of defective
products.

2000]

SNYDER v. AMERICANASSOCIATION OFBLOOD BANKS

platelets or with the plaintiff. The AABB neither obtained, processed,
nor transfused the contaminated platelets that infected the plaintift."
The court held, however, that the gravamen of the AABB's duty of care
was its role in the blood banking industry in 1983-4, when the
plaintiff received the contaminated unit of platelets. "69 In effect, the
court asked how considerations of fairness and policy could be applied
to justify the imposition of a duty upon a non-profit medical
association, such as the AABB, to a patient, such as the plaintiff, 0who
had received care from an institution accredited by the association.' '
As the court noted, the AABB was a voluntary association
composed of virtually every blood bank and non-profit blood center in
the United States.' 0 2 In the early 1980s, AABB member blood banks
and blood centers collected about one-half of the nation's blood supply
and transfused to patients 80 percent of the blood and products they
collected. 0 3 The court quoted the AABB's certificate of incorporation,
in which the AABB described itself as a "professional, non-profit,
scientific and administrative association for individuals and institutions
engaged in the many facets of blood and tissue banking, and
transfusion and transplantation medicine. ' 104 The AABB's executive
director stated that the association's mission was to promote public
health through the development and promulgation of blood banking
standards and to educate members and the public. 05 To that end, the
AABB sponsored seminars and workshops, published newsletters and
the journal, Transfusion. The AABB also published standards for
blood banking in its Technical Manual, and annually inspected and
accredited its members.10 6 The AABB lobbied the Congress of the
United States and state legislatures, and advised
federal and state
07
agencies in preparing blood-banking regulations. 1

9'See id at 1048.
'OSee id. at 1039.
'01See id at 1048.
'02See id at 1039.
10 3See Snyder, 676 A.2d at 1040.
1'4See id at 1040. Whether the AABB was a professional or trade organization vas once

the source of "divisive" arguments within the organization. See Eckert, supra note 31. at 290,
'O5See Snyder, 676 A.2d at 1040.
'See id
'07See id
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The AABB boasted that it led "the industry in setting policy and
standards of practice for its member blood banks in excess of the
FDA." 10 8 Blood banks throughout the United States, including BCBC,
adopted and relied upon AABB standards.' 0 9 As the executive director
of BCBC proclaimed, in 1984, the AABB standards were "the Bible of
the blood center."' 0 Theoretically, an AABB member that lost AABB
accreditation, but retained its FDA and New Jersey licenses, could have
continued operating. Practically, its operation would have been
significantly compromised because other hospitals and blood banks
prefer to work only with other AABB accredited members." '
Most significantly, the court noted the AABB actively participated
in establishing federal and state regulations for blood banks. So
influential was the AABB's involvement in the Blood Products
Advisory Council of the FDA that the FDA deferred to the AABB in
developing its own standards and guidelines regarding transfusionrelated AIDS.' 12 At the state level most state governments incorporated
AABB standards into their own state regulations. 1 3 The New Jersey
Department of Health also accepted AABB inspections in place of its
own inspections and adopted AABB standards for gathering medical
information from and performing physical examinations on prospective
donors."14 In December 1983, the AABB reassured its members
regarding potential blood bank liability for transfusion-related AIDS by
reminding them that compliance with AABB standards had frequently
been cited by courts as evidence of appropriate blood banking
practice. 115
Quoting the decision of the Appellate Division, the Supreme Court
of New Jersey agreed that the "unique and dominant role of the AABB
in blood-banking and the extent of its control over its institutional
members" established a duty of care between the AABB and blood
product recipients. 116 The Supreme Court of New Jersey went on to
0

f°S ee id.
'09See id.

"°See Snyder, 676 A.2d at 1040.
1"See id.
" 2See id. at 1041.
"3See id. at 1040.
" 4See id. at 1041.
"'See Snyder, 676 A.2d at 1041.
" 6See id. at 1039.
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state "the picture that emerges is of a private tax-exempt organization
with substantial power over the operation of blood banks, including
BCBC. That blood banks would accept direction from the AABB is
understandable-it was their organization." 117 So substantial was the
role of the AABB in the blood banking industry, the court could state,
rely on the AABB for the safety
"blood banks, hospitals, and patients
'Ils
supply."
blood
nation's
of the
Having determined the AABB exercised considerable power
within the blood banking industry, the court next examined whether the
AABB exercised that power appropriately in the early 1980s.119 In
1983, the AIDS Task Force, on which representatives from the AABB
served, recommended adoption of the hepatitis B core antibody test as
the surrogate test for HIV. 120 The AABB disagreed, disputing the
conclusion the AIDS virus was transmitted by blood or blood
products.' 2 ' The AABB opposed surrogate testing as too expensive
The
and too likely to lead to the rejection of too many donors."l
AABB's opposition to surrogate testing and direct donor questioning,
in the court's view, hardened even as evidence that AIDS could be
spread by blood or blood products accumulated. 123 In the spring of
1983, the AABB issued a list of standard procedures requiring only that
prospective donors be given information about AIDS. 24 The AABB
issued no requirement for surrogate testing or direct donor
125
In spite of the AABB's refusal to require surrogate
questioning.
testing, several blood banks implemented surrogate testing on their own
" 7See i& at 1041.
""See i d
" 90See id at 1044-48.
12See Shilts, supra note 54, at 221. The Aids Task Force considered three surrogate
tests: the hepatitis B core antibody test, the T-cell ratio test, and the absolute lyimphozyte tect
One expert reported that the hepatitis B core antibody test w;as positive in 83 percent of
homosexual men with AIDS, one hundred percent of intravenous drug users v'ith AIDS, and S7
percent of Haitians with AIDS. In the control group, composed of homosexual men not

afflicted with AIDS, 79 percent tested positive for the hepatitis B care antibody. Bazed on
those studies the Task Force concluded the hepatitis B core antibody test was the most
promising
21 surrogate test. See id
1 See Snyder, 676 A.2d at 1047.
'22See id

id
'2See
124See id at 1045-46.
125See Shifts, supra note 54, at 220; Snder,676 A.2d at 1045-46.
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in 1983 and 1984.126 In 1984, two reports, one published in the New
England Journal of Medicine and the other in the Annals of Internal
Medicine, concluded AIDS could be transmitted through blood or
blood products. 27
One month later, Mr. Snyder received his
transfusion.
On the basis of its findings the court concluded that the risk of
harm from transfusion-related AIDS was severe, and at the time of the
plaintiff's transfusion in August 1984, reasonably foreseeable. 128 The
court rejected the AABB's argument that it owed no duty to the
plaintiff because the evidence of transfusion-related AIDS was
inconclusive in 1984.129 "The foreseeability, not conclusiveness, of
harm suffices to give rise to a duty of care."' 130 The court held by 1984
evidence supporting the conclusion HIV could be transmitted by blood
transfusions was substantial enough for the AABB to foresee a
contaminated unit could transmit HIV.t31 By 1984 the AABB knew, or
should have known, of the32 substantial risk of contracting HIV infection
from blood transfusions.
The court concluded the AABB's dominance within the blood
banking industry established a duty of care, which the AABB exercised
negligently. 33 In making its determination, the court gave considerable
weight to the manner in which the AABB achieved its influence and to
what the court believed to be the AABB's stake in preserving its
position as the arbiter of blood banking standards:
Society has not thrust on the AABB its responsibility for the
safety of blood and blood products. The AABB sought and
126See Shilts, supra note 55, at 220. Among the blood banks implementing surrogate
testing were the Stanford University Blood Bank in San Francisco, California, the Tulane
University Medical Center Blood Bank in New Orleans, Louisiana, and the American National
Red Cross
regional center in San Jose, California. See Eckert, supra note 31, at 281.
127See Snyder, 676 A.2d at 1047. See James W. Curran, et al., Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Associated with Transfusions, 310 NEw ENG. J.MED. 73, 74
(1984); James W. Curran & Liewelyn F. Barker, The Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
Associated with Transfusions: The Evolving Perspective, 100 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 298,

299 (1984).
2

' S5ee Snyder, 676 A.2d at 1048-49.
129See id. at 1049.
3
D
°See id.

31
1 see
132See
33

id.
id.
' See Snyder, 676 A.2d at 1049.
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cultivated that responsibility. For years, it has dominated the
establishment of standards for the blood-banking industry...
[b]y words and conduct, the AABB invited blood banks,
hospitals, and
patients to rely on the AABB's recommended
34
procedures.1
AABB members, so the court believed, had a substantial financial
interest in the regulation of the blood banking industry.' 35 In 1984, as
the court 36noted, voluntary blood banks generated a billion dollars in
1
revenue.

The Snyder Court's Criteria for the Imposition of a Duty
The Snyder court made full use of the considerable discretion the
decisions in Dunphy and Carter allowed in imposing duties. The
Snyder court justified the imposition of a duty on the basis of its
conclusion about the AABB's financial stake in regulating the blood
banking industry. 137 Thus, the court could conclude "the AABB
resisted surrogate testing because it did not want to suffer the added
inconvenience and costs of such testing."'138 Another factor that
,veighed heavily with the Snyder court was the AABB's position as a
"standard-setting industry association."' 39 That factor distinguished
Snyder from Meyers because, in Meyers,
the NSPI had no power to
140
standards.
pool
swimming
enforce its
The Snyder decision applied principles to a professional
association that had been set forth in Meyers and other cases for
imposing a duty on trade associations. If a trade association grew
dominant enough to dictate industry standards, the court reasoned it
could be held liable to the customers of its member manufacturers and
distributors for deficient or negligently enforced standards. 14 Implicit
" 4See id at 1048.
"'See
id at 1050.
136See id.
7

13See id

I3 SSee Snyder, 676 A.2d at 1055.

39The term "standard-setting industry association" w'as first used in Weigand v.

University Hosp. of N.Y., 659 N.Y.S.2d 395, 399 (N.Y. 1997) in its discussion of Snyder v.
American
Ass'n of Blood Banks.
140See Meyers v. Donatacci, 531 A.2d 39S, 403 (N.J. 1984),
41
W Snyder, 676 A.2d at 1050. "In 1984, the AABB was more than a trade asso.-tatin. It

was the governing body of a significantly self-regulated industry." See id. (emphazis added)
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in the reasoning of the Snyder decision was the court's assumption that
the example of trade associations applied to non-profit medical
associations, such as the AABB. The majority opinion in Snyder never
fully considered whether countervailing policy considerations
applicable to non-profit medical associations, but not necessarily
applicable to trade associations, justified a grant of qualified immunity
to the AABB. 142 The AABB never argued a defense of qualified
immunity. Accordingly, the court refused to remand for the purpose of
considering that defense, 143 and so never explored any distinctions
between trade and non-profit medical associations.
The Snyder court set forth four criteria by which considerations of
fairness and policy could coalesce to impose a duty when the defendant
was a professional association lacking privity or some special
relationship to the plaintiff. First, the harm to the plaintiff posed by the
defendant's conduct had to be reasonably foreseeable, a reiteration of
the principle expressed by Justice (then Judge) Cardozo in Palsgrafv.
Long Island Railroad.144 Second, the association's influence within its
profession had to be so dominant the members had little discretion 145
in
choosing whether to join or to adopt the association's standards.
Moreover, the members and those whom they served had to have relied
on the association's standards for their well being. 146 Third, the
association had to have actively sought to become the arbiter of its
profession's standards. 147 Finally, the association must have had a
financial interest in maintaining
its position as the arbiter of its
8
standards.14
profession's
Professional associations concerned with matters of public
health are not fraternal organizations that exist solely for the
benefit of their members. Playing a vital role in the
protection of health, these associations are inescapably
imbued with a public interest. The associations' commitment
to public health should not immunize them from liability for
142See id. at 1052-53.

1'4 See id.at 1053
144See
id. at 1049. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 192S).
45

' See id.at 1048.

146See Snyder, 676 A.2d at 1048.
147See id. at 1053.

14'See id.
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the negligent discharge of their obligations. Nor should the
associations enjoy immunity when they stubbornly reject
persuasive evidence, unreasonably prolong the debate, and
fail to inform their constituents of threats to public health.'49
Although the majority found policy considerations imposed a
duty, it never considered whether other competing policy
considerations might warrant a grant of some form of immunity. That
task was left to the dissent.
JUSTICE GARIBALDI'S DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Garibaldi, the lone dissenter, agreed that the AABB owed a
duty, 150 but she argued the AABB's "quasi-governmental nature" in
regulating blood banks, as well as public policy considerations,
justified a grant of qualified immunity provided a showing of good
faith could be made. 151 Justice Garibaldi based her dissent on two
concepts. First, she considered a line of cases from New Jersey and
other jurisdictions in which immunity had been incrementally extended
on the basis of policy considerations to private individuals or groups
undertaking various quasi-governmental tasks. 152 Second, she adopted
a broader definition of the doctrine of "functional comparability," that
is, the grant of immunity to private individuals or organizations based
on the similarity of their responsibilities to those actors traditionally
afforded immunity, such as judges or legislators.' 53 Justice Garibaldi
argued the adoption by the New Jersey Department of Health (DOH) of
AABB standards together -with the public's need to have such standards
justified a measure of protection for the AABB.'14

t 49See id at

1055.

"OSee id
'See Snyder, 676 A.2d at 1056.
'52See id at 1060.
'See id at 1061.

'-See id
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Extension of Immunities
Justice Garibaldi relied on a 1979 New Jersey case, CentennialLand &
Development Company v. Township of Medford,155 for the principle

that policy considerations could justify an extension of immunity. In
Centennial Land the Superior Court of New Jersey granted absolute
immunity to the Medford Township Zoning Board.' s 6 The New Jersey
Supreme Court held "[t]he policy factors are myriad and weighty on
both sides of the argument. Resolution of the issue involves a
balancing of the citizen's interest in having a remedy for a wrong
suffered and society's interest in attracting qualified persons to public

office."' 157 Although CentennialLand did not precisely follow the facts
in Snyder because the zoning commissioners acted in a formal
governmental capacity, Justice Garibaldi nevertheless argued the

decision justified the extension of immunity beyond its traditional
beneficiaries. 58 Policy considerations,
she noted, always justified each
59
expansion.1
of
increment
Justice Garibaldi cited fifteen cases in which immunity had been

granted to private individuals or organizations for their good faith
performance of quasi-governmental tasks.' 60 The majority countered
that, in each of the cases, Justice Garibaldi cited, the private individual
or organization acted "pursuant to a governmental grant of
authority."' 161 Thus, the distinction in the eyes of the majority between
155See Centennial Land & Dev. Co. v. Township of Medford, 397 A.2d 1136 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1979).
56
"'
See id.
' 7See Snyder, 676 A.2d at 1056 (citing CentennialLand, 397 A.2d at 1136).
'58See CentennialLand, 397 A.2d at 1139.
9
"60See Snyder, 676 A.2d at 1056.
' See id. at 1060-61. See e.g., Austem v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 898 F.2d
882 (2nd Cir. 1990); Kwoun v. Southeast Mo. Prof I Standards Review Org., 811 F.2d. 401

(8th Cir. 1987); Wasyl v. First Boston Corp, 813 F.2d 1579 (9th Cir. 1987); Austin Mun. See,,
Inc. v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 757 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1985); Bushman v. Seiler,
755 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1985); Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1962); Citrano v.
Allen Correctional Ctr., 891 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. La. 1995); Weissman v. Hassett, 47 B.R. 462
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Lythgoe v. Guinn, 884 P.2d 1085 (Alaska 1994); Craviolini v. Scholer &
Fuller Assoc. Architects, 357 P.2d 611 (Ariz. 1960); Latt v. Superior Ct., 212 Cal. Rptr. 380
(Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Rubenstein v. Otterbourg, 357 N.Y.S.2d 62 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1973);
City of Durham v. Reidsville Eng'g Co., 120 S.E.2d 564 (N.C. 1961); Warner v. Grand
County, 57 F.3d 962 (10th Cir. 1995); Corey v. New York Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205 (6th
Cir. 1982).
1
16See Snyder, 676 A.2d at 1051.
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Centennial Land and Snyder was the legal obligation zoning
commissioners incurred when agreeing to serve, 1in2 contrast to the
absence of any such obligation for AABB members. 6
Justice Garibaldi found the distinction unpersuasive. The DOH
had been established under state law with the authority to regulate
blood banking. 63 Under its statutory authority, the DOH incorporated
AABB standards into its regulations and allowed blood banks to use
AABB standards to fulfill licensing requirements.'"
In Justice
Garibaldi's analysis, the dispositive question was whether the DOH's
adoption of AABB standards constituted a delegation of governmental
authority sufficient to justify an extension of qualified immunity to the
AABB. 1 65 Absent a direct legislative or contractual grant of authority,
the majority held there could be no immunity. 1 6 Justice Garibaldi
argued immunity should be granted or withheld on the basis of the
nature of the decision-making process to be protected, not the existence
of a formal grant of governmental authority.
Grants of immunity, she explained, are based fundamentally on
the need to assure "vigorous and appropriate decisionmaking" in
certain areas of endeavor. 16s Thus, if a governmental agency delegates
de facto authority to a professional association, as Justice Garibaldi
contended the DOH delegated the authority to devise blood banking
standards to the AABB, a grant of immunity may be varranted. 169
Whether immunity will be granted depends on two factors. First,
whether the "decision-making process" at issue (for example, in Snyder
the development of blood banking standards) is of sufficient public
importance. This is but another way of saying policy considerations
may shape immunities. Second, whether there has been at least a de
facto delegation of governmental authority to the private actor make the
decisions at issue.1 70 This latter factor represents Justice Garibaldi's
application of functional comparability.
162See id. at 1052.
16
See id at 1061.

' 645See id.

16See id
65
See Snyder, 676 A.2d at 1050-5 1.
' 67
See id at 1061.
161See id
'

69

See id

170See id.
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Policy Considerations
As before Justice Garibaldi began her analysis with Centennial Land.
The court in Centennial Land observed many of the local zoning
officials served voluntarily and without pay, often working long hours
at night.171 To deny them immunity, the Centennial Land court held,
would be to discourage "intelligent civic-minded persons" from serving
in such capacities. 72 Many AABB committee members were also
unpaid volunteers, as were the zoning board members in Centennial
Land.17 3 For example, a number of AABB committee members were
Michigan
on the faculties of prestigious universities such as Yale
74 and
where they taught and served as laboratory directors.1
Because the AABB, a private association, performed a quasigovernmental task, which the state would otherwise have to perform,
Justice Garibaldi argued public policy warranted a grant of immunity to
the AABB. 175 In areas requiring specialized knowledge such as blood
banking, Justice Garibaldi continued, the state needed to rely on
associations such as the AABB for guidance.17 6 Citing Costa v. Josey,
Justice Garibaldi argued when the government has to make difficult
policy decisions requiring specialized knowledge, such as regulating
blood banking, traditional tort principles restricting the grant of
immunity to government actors may not work well. 177 The government
must rely on private individuals, but without immunity private
individuals may withhold assistance.1 7 8 The United States or the State
of New Jersey would absolutely be immune from liability in situations
such as Snyder Justice Garibaldi observed, but
the AABB, as a private
79
organization would be denied any immunity. 1
Justice Garibaldi relied on two earlier New Jersey cases to support
her position. In Sherman v. Ford County Counseling Center,l s° a
171See Centennial Land & Development Co. v. Township of Medford, 397 A.2d 1136,
1140 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979).
'72See id.
173see Snyder, 676 A.2d at 1057.
174See id. at 1058.
75
1 See id. at 1058.
176See id. at 1058.
177See id. at 1059 (citing Costa v. Josey, 415 A.2d 337 (N.J. 1980)).

17 SSee Snyder, 676 A.2d at 1059.
179See id. at 1057.
8

'See Sherman v. Ford County Counseling Ctr., 987 F.2d 397, 399 (7th Cir. 1993).

2000]

SNYDER v. AMERICANASSOCIATION

OFBLOOD BANKS

private hospital admitted, detained and treated a mentally ill patient
pursuant to a court order. 181 To deny immunity, the court reasoned,
would be to discourage public service. S2 In Berends it City of Atlantic
City,183 an airplane crashed while attempting to land at the Atlantic City
airport. Pan Am Management Systems operated the airport.'.4 The
plaintiff argued the city's decision to close one of the airport's two
runways created a dangerous situation, which caused the crash.0 5 The
court dismissed the suit against the city because of statutory
immunity.1 6 The court also dismissed the claim against Pan Am
because Pan Am made a substantial contribution to the same decisionmaking process which shielded the city from liability. 13 7 Justice
Garibaldi reasoned, following Berends and emphasizing the content of
the decision-making process, it would be unfair to punish the AABB
for its participation in the same high level policy-making, which
justified the government's immunity.188 Even though no statute
granted immunity to the AABB, "statutory immunities are reflective of
public policy and may serve as a guide to the evolution of related
common law immunities.' I S9
Policy considerations regarding
bloodbanking practices sought to enlist the help of private
organizations in formulating government regulations in areas requiring
special expertise.' 90 The AABB could, Justice Garibaldi contended,
justifiably be granted qualified immunity because it participated in the
decision-making process by which government blood-bandng
regulations were formulated, a process requiring protection for the
private participant. 191 The final test was how similar the AABB w.as in
function to a governmental agency in the decision-making process or in
other words, functional comparability.
ISISee id
'See id at 406.
3

See Berends v. City of Atlantic City, 621 A.2d 972, 975 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div,

1993).
'2Seeid.
at 976.

ISSSee id at 977.
"'See id
t
See id at 981.
5
'sSee Snyder,676 A.2d at 1059.
1s9See idtat 1057 (quoting Crawn v. Campo, 643 A,2d 600, 605 (NJ. 1994)).
'9'See id at 1061.
'91See id at 1057.

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 3:243

Functional Comparability
"Functional comparability" was first used by the U. S. Supreme Court
in Imbler v. Pachtman.192 There the court extended the grant of
immunity to prosecutors and grand jurors on the basis of their
similarity to judges. 93 All three-judges, prosecutors, and grand
jurors-made discretionary judgments based on evidence presented to
them. 194 Two years later, the court, in Butz v. Economou, 9 applied a
three part test to determine functional comparability.' 96 First, the entity
claiming immunity had to operate in a manner comparable to those
traditionally granted immunity at common law, such as judges or
legislators. 97 Second, the risk of intimidation or harassment had to
exist for those performing such duties.' 98 Third, adequate legal
safeguards had to be in place to prevent abuse. 99
Justice Garibaldi argued the AABB merited qualified immunity
because the DOH adopted AABB standards and substituted them for
DOH regulations. 20 0 In effect, she argued, the DOH conscripted the
AABB into governmental service by delegating a portion of its
regulatory authority to the AABB when it co-opted AABB standards
for its own.2 0 By choosing AABB standards over any it might have
developed on its own, the DOH granted a measure of de facto
governmental authority to the AABB.
The AABB became more than
a "mere advisory body" to the DOH, much as Pan Am was more than a
"mere advisory body" to Atlantic City. 20 3 The appellate court had
192See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424, n.20 (1976).
' 93See id.

'94See id.
195See Butz, v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,485 (1977).
'96See id.
97
See
19
See
99

id.
id.
1 See Joseph, supra note 21, at 636-37 (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 513-17).
200
20

See Snyder v. American Ass'n of Blood Banks, 676 A.2d 1036, 1058 (N.J. 1996).
See id.

202

See id. at 1061.
See id. Pan Am, as the majority noted, acted under a contract with Atlantic City. That
arrangement, in the majority's opinion, distinguished Snyder from Berends in justifying
withholding the grant of immunity. As Justice Garibaldi noted, the Berends decision explicitly
omitted considerations of the contract because it had not been entered into evidence. One of
the issues in Berends was whether Pan Am was entitled to derivative immunity, that is,
203

immunity deriving from its governmental duty. But the appellate court did not hold Pan Am
was entitled to derivative immunity because that would have required the court to determine if
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conferred immunity on Pan Am because of its involvement in the same
decision-making process on which Atlantic City's immunity was
based. 20 4 Moreover, the decision-making processes in both Berends
and Snyder were similar in that each was the product of a multi-agency
discussion in which the respective government agencies also
participated.2 5
Justice Garibaldi cautioned that as a private association, the
AABB could be encouraged to make negligent decisions if allowed
complete immunity because the association would bear no costs of 2its
mistakes, but would enjoy the financial benefits of its decisions. @
Qualified immunity, that is immunity in the absence of malice or bad
faith, offered a compromise, preserving the incentive of private
associations such as the AABB to continue developing standards
beneficial to the public, while preserving the right of individuals to
seek redress when malice is found.20 7 According to Justice Garibaldi,
the three tests of functional comparability were met: the AABB acted in
manner similar to a governmental agency, it was at risk for lawsuits
stemming from its quasi-governmental activities, and an adequate
remedy existed in the form of qualified immunity to protect innocent
parties. 20 S Thus, the
AABB was functionally comparable to a
209
agency.
governmental
THE SNYDER IMPACT
Will courts consider duties as well as inimunities before imposing third
party liability on non-profit medical associations in future litigation?
To date the majority opinion in Snyder has been the more persuasive,
but the predictive value of the decision is uncertain because no
defendant has argued qualified immunity. Two courts, one in
Louisiana and the other in New York, have followed Snyder in
imposing a duty on the AABB to recipients of transfusions from AABB
Pan Am had deviated from the contract specifications. See Berends v. City of Atlantic City,
621 A.2d 972, 980 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1993).
2
"'See Snyder, 676 A.2d at 1060.
205

See id

206

See id at 1062.

20 7

See id

203

See id.at 1060-62.
2 9
0 See Snyder, 676 A.2d at 1060-62.
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Neither decision addressed the issue of

qualified immunity because the AABB, as it had done in Snyder,
argued its case on the basis of duty analysis. The courts in Louisiana
and New York rejected the AABB's reliance on Meyers and the
comparison of the AABB to a weak trade association, such as the
NSPI. Justice Garibaldi's dissenting argument that non-profit medical

associations may merit qualified immunity when government agencies
adopt association standards in matters of public health has been largely
ignored. If this proves true then the majority opinion in Snyder could
eventually have a chilling effect on the involvement of non-profit
20

1n Douglass v. Alton Oschner Medical Foundation,(696 So. 2d 136 (La. Ct. App.

1997), the Court of Appeals of Louisiana for the Fifth Circuit vacated a grant of summary
judgment in favor of the AABB. The plaintiffs daughter had contracted AIDS from a
transfusion received during surgery in 1983. See id at 137. The plaintiff alleged the AABB
had been negligent in failing to establish appropriate procedures for screening blood for AIDS.
See id. The AABB argued, as it had done in Snyder, because it was a voluntary, non-profit
association with no regulatory power over member blood banks it owed no duty to the plaintiff.
See id. The court noted the imposition of a duty in Louisiana required a case by case analysis.
See id. at 139 (citing Gresham v. Davenport, 537 So. 2d 1144, 1146 (La. 1989)). The court
reviewed the plaintiffs evidence, which established the AABB had considerably more
influence in the blood banking industry than its status as a voluntary, non-profit association
suggested. By late 1982, the court concluded, the AABB could reasonably have foreseen 1IV
could be transmitted by blood. See id. The court found persuasive not only the dccision in
Snyder, but also numerous other cases in Louisiana and elsewhere in which blood banks had
been relieved of liability upon a showing of non-negligent conduct and compliance with AABB
standards. See id. Consequently, the court vacated the trial court's grant of summary judgment
after finding several issues of material fact. See id. at 140.
The facts in Weigand v. University Hospital of New York University, 659 NY.S, 395,
396 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997), followed very closely those of Snyder and Douglass. The plaintiff's
decedent contracted AIDS from a transfusion during surgery in 1983. See id. at 396. As in the
preceding cases, the plaintiff alleged the AABB had promulgated deficient standards for the
screening of blood for HIV. See id. The New York court, in rejecting the AABB's motion for
dismissal, followed the analysis in Snyder very closely. The New York court found the
AABB's reliance on Meyers inapposite. See id. at 399. There was, in the opinion of the court, a
distinction between the degree of influence the AABB exercised regarding blood banking
standards and that of the NSPI regarding swimming pool standards. The New York court held
"if the industry association negligently sets inadequate standards for blood collection and
screening and those standards are followed by a member blood bank, resulting in the collection
and transfusion of tainted blood, it is the recipient of the blood transfusion who will be
damaged, not the blood bank." Id. In addressing the concern of extending a duty, the court
held the extension must reach specifically foreseeable parties while at the same time keeping
liability to manageable levels, In Weigand the court noted the parties were clearly
foreseeable-those who received blood transfused by blood banks belonging to the AABB and
following its standards. See id.at 401. Because the AABB was a "standard-setting association"
the court held the AABB had a duty to the recipients of blood transfused under its standards
and could be found liable for negligently promulgating deficient standards. See id.
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medical associations in public health matters at a time when their
contributions are needed most.
As medicine becomes even more complex and technologically
sophisticated, the need by state governments and the federal
government for assistance from professional medical associations, such
as the AABB, in developing standards will become indispensable. This
much Jeffrey P. Koplan, the director for the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) acknowledged in January 1999 in an
address to the National Health Council (NHC).21' Dr. Koplan urged
greater collaboration between those acting to improve public health,
such as the CDC, and those providing care to individual patients, such
as the members of the NHC.2 12 Dr. Koplan cited one example of the
need for cooperation was in controlling the indiscriminate use of
antibiotics, a practice that has led to the development of antibiotic
resistant microorganisms. 2 13 Yet implicit in any collaboration to curb
indiscriminate antibiotic use is the formulation of standards defining
when antibiotics should be used and when they should be avoided.
Implicit in the formulation of standards is the potential for liability
should those standards prove inadequate.
Other areas of medicine require the same need for collaboration
and could pose the same sort of risks for liability. Dr. Koplan stated
there were "probably hundreds" of areas where collaboration is
needed.214 Transplantation medicine is one example. Advances in
transplantation medicine have progressed rapidly in the past two
decades, but a shortage of organ donors has led to an expansion of
criteria by which suitable donors can be selected. 215 This in turn
increases the risk of a bad outcome in transplanting an organ because
the donor may be more likely to have a chronic disease such as diabetes
or coronary atherosclerosis affecting the organ to be transplanted.21"
Organ donation also requires screening for transmissible diseases such
21

'See 281 J.A.M.A. 501, 501 (Feb. 10, 1999). The National Health Council is a nonprofit organization composed of over one hundred voluntary health agencies, professional
associations
and other groups interested in health care. See id.
212

See id.

213
214See

id
See id.

2 5

1 See MARY

Jo

WILEY ET AL., ORGAN DONATION AND TRANSrLArTATIO.N:, LEGAL.

MEDICINE
323, 333 (American College of Legal Medicine. 4th ed. 1993).
216
See id
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as infections and cancers.217 Even though the federal government
heavily regulates transplantation medicine and the Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act provides a measure of statutory immunity, the potential for
liability exists when a donated organ has been inadequately screened or
a potential recipient has been denied an organ. 218 Yet, the standards by
which organs may be harvested and donors selected require the input of
physicians who could, under Snyder's reasoning, ultimately be held
liable for their good faith development of standards.
Reproduction medicine offers another example of the same
dilemma. As prenatal testing for genetically transmitted diseases
becomes more sophisticated the indications for such testing may exceed
21
the expertise of the pregnant woman's primary care obstretician. 9
The Council on Scientific Affairs of the American Medical Association
has formulated a list of indications for referring a patient to a specialist
in genetic counseling. 22° An obstretician who fails to refer a patient to
a specialist in genetic counseling could be liable in an action for a
wrongful birth or wrongful life. 221 After Snyder could the non-profit
medical association that formulated the standards in good faith also be
found liable if the standards proved inadequate?
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion, one hopes, provides an understanding of the
reasoning behind the majority's imposition of a duty to third party
blood product recipients by the AABB, as well as of Justice Garibaldi's
arguments for a grant of qualified immunity to the AABB. The
majority opinion in Snyder applied the example of a trade association to
the AABB, a non-profit medical association.
Recognizing the
substantial influence the AABB exercised within the blood-banking
industry the court, following the reasoning of earlier trade association
cases, found the AABB owed a duty to third party blood product
recipients. The court acknowledged the imposition of a duty was an
2"See id.
21
'See id. at 338-40.
2 19
See MICHAEL S. CARDWELL & THOMAS G. KIRKHOPE, REPRODUCTION PATIENTS,
LEGAL22MEDICINE
380 (American College of Legal Medicine, 4th ed. 1998).
0
See id.
22 1
See id.
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essentially subjective process, a matter of "fairness and policy." Given
the AABB's influence and the potential for harm from negligently
promulgated standards, the court reasonably determined the AABB
owed a duty, but it never fully examined whether other competing
policy considerations might have warranted a grant of qualified
immunity. In the absence of some legislative grant of authority to the
AABB, the majority found there could be no qualified immunity.
In her dissent, Justice Garibaldi argued qualified immunity should
offset any liability the AABB faced, provided the AABB could show
good faith. 222 Accordingly, Justice Garibaldi found the majority's
definition of a "grant of governmental authority" too narrowly drawn,
limited as it was to a legislative grant or contract. 3 By substituting
AABB standards in place of any it might have developed on its own,
Justice Garibaldi contended the DOH granted de facto, if not de jure,
governmental authority to the AABB 224 in that the DOH incorporated
AABB standards and made them mandatory. Thus, any blood bank
regulated by the DOH lost the option of substituting other standards.
Much of the AABB's influence, Justice Garibaldi continued, derived
from the DOH's ratification of AABB standards 2 5 As Justice
Garibaldi wrote, "[t]he majority seeks to have it both ways: finding a
duty of care and liability because of the governmental authority
delegated to the AABB, but then denying immunity because of a
perceived lack of governmental authority."2 6 Without immunity a
governmental agency's adoption of a professional association's
standards increases the likelihood the association will be found liable, if
those standards should foster negligence. The governmental agency,
however, remains immune even though it shares7 some of the blame for
the promulgation of those negligent standards. 2
Justice Garibaldi's dissenting opinion argues a court's decision to
deny immunity to a non-profit medical association must consider not
only the position of authority the association occupies within its
profession, but also the reasoning that led to the adoption of the
22 2

See Snyder v. American Ass'n of Blood Banks, 676 A.2d 1036. 1063 (NJ 10361

223See
idat 1061.
4

21See id

22See idat 1058.
226See idat 1061.
7
22
See Snyder, 676 A.2d at 1061.
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association's standards by a governmental agency. A contract or
legislative grant of authority from the governmental agency to the
association, while a factor to be considered, is not dispositive. This is
because in the absence of a contract or governmental grant of authority,
the agency may still adopt and impose the association's standards upon
those whom it regulates. In this way the governmental agency can
indirectly impose liability upon a non-profit medical association by coopting its standards, while at the same time avoiding the costs of
developing standards independently. Paradoxically, the greater merit a
non-profit medical association achieves and the more widely its
standards are adopted by those within the profession the more
vulnerable the association becomes to a "governmental takeover" of its
standards and to liability should those standards prove inadequate. If a
governmental agency chooses to co-opt standards it will more likely to
be those of "standard-setting" association, such as the AABB in
bloodbanking. The ability of the government to adopt and impose the
standards of a non-profit medical association, or for that matter, any
professional association, may present a disincentive to professional
associations to develop standards unless the possibility of qualified
immunity exists to offset the risk of liability.
Justice Garibaldi's dissent in Snyder suggests that when the
government must rely on non-profit medical associations for the
development of standards important to public health "standard tort
principles" regarding the application of duties and immunities may
ultimately prove detrimental to the public interest. 228 Those who rely
upon the standards promulgated by non-profit medical associations
deserve protection from inadequate and negligently adopted standards.
Yet without the protection of qualified immunity for good faith
decisions non-profit medical associations may be discouraged from
participating in the regulation of their respective specialties at a time
when their expertise is most needed.229

22
See
229

id. at 1057 (citing Costa v. Josey, 415 A.2d 330, 337 (N.J. 1980)),
See ic at 1061.

